

## Discussion Article

# Four rounds of the Finnish NATO debate

*Tuomas Forsberg, Director, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies*

## Abstract

Finland became a full member of NATO in April 2023. In this article, I will review four rounds of the Finnish NATO debate from the 1990s to the 2020s leading to the membership application in May 2022. There were some elements that distinguished the debates in each decade, but the arguments both in favour as well as against the membership remained basically the same. Russia's invasion of Ukraine did not change the key reasons in favour of membership in NATO, namely added deterrence and protection to strengthen Finland's security, but they became more compelling in the eyes of the public. Applying for membership in NATO was seen as too uncertain and the former Warsaw Pact members as a wrong reference group in the 1990s, the risk of being dragged into faraway wars was deemed as too great in the 2000s, and the policy of military non-alignment with a close NATO partnership was still seen as the best strategy to keep Russia at bay in the 2010s.

## Keywords

Finland, NATO, military non-alignment, public debate, security

## Introduction

Finland's decision to apply for membership in NATO after Russia had started its invasion of Ukraine came as surprise to those who got used to the stability of both the political parties' as well as the public's view of NATO and Finland's membership in it (Arter, 2022). Only two parties represented in the parliament, the centre-right National Coalition Party and the centre-liberal Swedish People's Party of Finland, had been in favour of Finland's membership in NATO before 2022. There was never majority of the public supporting the membership, but typically only about a quarter or a fifth of the population. The change in spring 2022, however, was swift and comprehensive. A clear majority of the public up to 80 per cent supported the membership in May 2022 when the decision was made with a stunning majority of 188 for and 8 against in the vote on Finland's NATO membership application.

The key reason for this change was Russia's invasion of Ukraine, but why was there no major change in the attitudes towards Finland's NATO membership before? Finland, after all, had not excluded the possibility that Russia could use military force towards its neighbours but had been prepared for such an eventuality on the basis of its military non-alignment and formed a close partnership with NATO. Hence, how can the change be understood in light of the arguments presented in the public debate since the end of the Cold War? There was practically no new argument presented in the public debate in 2022. The opinion change cannot be explained on the basis of the arguments themselves but rather the geostrategic situation changed the felt persuasiveness of the arguments. Finland could be a perfect case of David Welch's (2006) theory of foreign policy change, according to which highly bureaucratized and democratic regimes are likely to change their foreign policy only when the policy at hand is seen as badly failing.

In this article, I will review four rounds of the Finnish NATO debate from the 1990s to the 2020s. Separating distinct rounds on the basis of decades is, of course, somewhat artificial. However, the four phases, although not coinciding exactly with the decades,

can be separated in terms of NATO's evolving role and Russia's relationship with the West that framed the domestic debate on NATO membership in Finland (see, e.g., Penttilä and Karvinen, 2022). However, perhaps the surprising aspect is how little the debate as such changed over the decades. The key arguments remained basically the same from the 1990s to the spring of 2022, but the reasons in favour of membership became more compelling because of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, while those against lost their impact.

## 1990s: Wrong timing and reference group

The Finnish debate on joining NATO started in the mid-1990s when NATO announced the policy of open doors and Finland decided to join the EU. There was some discussion already right after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when Finland had decided to apply for membership in the European Union, that the geopolitical change in Europe and Finland's new orientation might also lead to a membership in NATO. However, much of that debate was speculative because it was not clear whether or when the Alliance was going to accept new members in the first place.

When NATO's open-door policy was announced in the mid-1990s, the domestic NATO debate in Finland became more concrete (Arter, 1996). At the same time, worries about Russia's future development grew when President Boris Yeltsin's position as the leader of Russia weakened, the process of democratization stalled, and Russian nationalists who questioned the legitimacy of Russia's borders, such as Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, gained in popularity. Finland joined NATO's partnership for peace programme and started to intensify its cooperation with the alliance.

Yet, any existence of a security deficit was vehemently denied. The Government Report on Security Policy delivered to the Parliament in 1995 stated that "Finland will not seek new defence solutions", but "if the international environment changes essentially, Finland will reconsider its security choices in the light of this development" (Finnish Government, 1995). This was the first time when the Government

formulated the so called “option policy” towards NATO: Finland is not considering membership at the moment but does not exclude it as a future option either.

At the same time, only a few public figures and hardly any politicians openly suggested that Finland should consider NATO membership. More often the argument was about the need to explore the membership issue in greater detail or conduct a debate than a clear position in favour of it. Max Jakobson (1996), a former diplomat and a grey eminence of Finnish foreign policy, presented perhaps the most prominent intervention on behalf of Finland’s membership in NATO. In March 1996, he argued in a widely publicised talk that Finland should apply for membership in NATO because of the failure of democratization in Russia. He also predicted that sooner or later Finland, together with Sweden and Austria, would become NATO members.

The politicians, however, mainly eschewed the question of NATO membership because they did not want to provoke Russia and EU integration had been given the priority. After Finland had joined the EU, the public debate focused on participation in the common currency. Moreover, the applicants to NATO were the wrong reference group for Finland because they were former Soviet allies. For example, Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen stated in 1995 that the NATO membership question was not topical because “Finland is not an eastern European country” (Keskinen, 1995).

In the 1990s, there was still quite a lot of scepticism of what kind of alliance NATO actually was. The Cold War image according to which all military alliances are harmful was rather strong. The enlargement of NATO and its intervention in Kosovo were widely criticized for being destabilizing actions. Finland’s NATO membership was also resisted for reasons that it might erode the country’s own territorial defence and will to defend by putting emphasis on the professional units and expeditionary force instead of conscription-based national defence.

## 2000s: Ever closer cooperation but no need for membership

The early 2000s were marked by the global war on terrorism as well as by Russia’s improved relations with NATO during Vladimir Putin’s first term as President of Russia (2000–04). In Finland, the NATO debate intensified because of the second post-Cold War enlargement round of NATO that also included the Baltic States. Some pundits, such as the former advisor to the president, Alpo Rusi (2000, 307), did not think that Finland should have joined NATO in the first enlargement round but that it would be the correct time to do so after that. At least, the argument that Finland’s membership in NATO would destabilize the Baltic Sea area and cause problems to the Baltic States if they were not members of NATO was off the table.

In the 2000s, the debate on Finland’s membership in NATO normalized. The Atlantic Council of Finland was established in 1999 with the aim of fostering discussion on NATO and the transatlantic relations. The foreign policy elite consisting of civil servants, soldiers, and security policy experts had become largely in favour of Finland’s membership in NATO. Although NATO membership was supported only by less than 30 per cent of the population, in the media, for example, in the op-ed pages, the share of the proponents and opponents was more even. Many media representatives or whole newspapers also seemed pro-NATO in their attitudes (Rahkonen, 2007). For example, the leading daily newspaper, *Helsingin Sanomat* (2004), adopted a positive view of Finland’s membership in NATO in 2004, arguing that military non-alignment was “an orphan and unnecessary phrase” that belonged in history.

Soon thereafter also the centre-right National Coalition Party took a positive stance towards the NATO membership in its party congress in 2006. The party’s candidate in the presidential elections 2006, Sauli Niinistö, did not directly advocate Finland’s membership in NATO but said that he was in favour of a “more European NATO” where the US was still a partner but the role of the European states had become more significant (Astikainen, 2006). Although Niinistö did not win the elections in 2006, but may have in fact lost because of his positive view of NATO, this election debate constituted a clear but momentary peak in the public discussion on Finland’s NATO membership, at least according

to the largest Finnish online discussion platform *Suomi24* (see Nortio et al, 2022). When Ilkka Kanerva of the National Coalition Party became foreign minister in 2007, he asked Finland's ambassador to NATO, Antti Sierla (2007), to compile a report on Finland's membership in NATO that would soften the prevailing prejudices.

While the security concerns seemed to be paramount still in the 1990s, arguments emphasizing NATO as a channel of influence and the need to belong to the same club as the majority of the EU members gained in ascendancy in the late 1990s and early 2000s (see Forsberg, 2002; Rahkonen, 2007). Security concerns had not disappeared, but NATO membership was seen more as an insurance for some distant future than as a response to an acute threat (see Nortio et al, 2022). Even if the Russian menace had been the underlying reason, it did not seem to be the burning issue and provide a winning argument in the debate. Rather, Russia's rapprochement with NATO and the West in general could be seen as an added reason that stressed NATO's role as a hub of European and perhaps global security cooperation. If Finland did not want to become marginalized, NATO was the place to be. For many, the war of Kosovo had shown that the EU could not replace NATO any time soon with its defence dimension.

At the same time, when the reasons for Finland's membership became more clearly articulated, the negative effects of a potential NATO membership also became more visible. Political parties and the politicians in general were rather reluctant to openly advocate for Finland's membership in NATO. They supported the idea of cooperating with NATO and keeping the option of joining it, should the circumstances change, but they did not see any reason to alter the policy. The number of outright sceptics or critics among the politicians did not grow but no other party than the National Coalition Party was willing to support the idea of Finland's membership in NATO in the 2000s (see Särkkä, 2019).

President Martti Ahtisaari had had a rather positive view of NATO and acted, in his own words, more as a "couch player" on behalf of the international community that NATO represented than as a impartial mediator in the conflict. While Ahtisaari

represented liberalist thinking, Finland's former president Mauno Koivisto was an arch-realist. He did not regard the NATO membership at all as a good idea. "What would we do there? What would we get from there?" he asked sceptically after the Kosovo war (Akkanen, 1999). Koivisto's scepticism resonated with the public since NATO's military intervention in Kosovo, and the US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, all seemed to decrease the popularity of the membership in the early 2000s. The fear that Finns would need to fight in faraway wars of not their own choosing was one of the main reasons to oppose NATO membership. As Russia did not seem to pose a threat, Finland's membership bid would only unnecessarily alienate it.

When Tarja Halonen became President of Finland in 2000, she regarded it as her mission to prevent Finland's membership in NATO (Lehtilä, 2012). In an interview, she contended that she had not seen any convincing argument as to why Finland should join NATO (Vesikansa, 2007). Nevertheless, she did not reject the political mainstream position of keeping the option of joining NATO in the future should the circumstances change. In practice this meant that Finland cherished its partnership with NATO and was willing to contribute to NATO's operation in Afghanistan. The debate over Finland's membership therefore partly shifted to the question of how close to membership Finland could get without becoming a member or whether such practical cooperation would lead to membership without major political debate.

## 2010s: The ambiguity of the Russian threat

The next phase in Finland's domestic NATO debate started with Putin's speech at the Munich security conference and the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 and then continued to the Ukraine crises and Russia's annexation of Crimea. At the same time, NATO took steps back towards being a defence alliance whose aim is to protect the territory of its member states.

The Russo-Georgian war triggered some renewed discussion in NATO membership in Finland but it did not cause any major shift in the attitudes. The government had accepted that Finland keeps the

option of applying for membership in NATO but the Russo-Georgian war was seen as being far away and having only indirect repercussions for Finland (Hänninen and Rantanen, 2008). Although Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb (2008) of the National Coalition Party regarded the date “080808” as a turning point, even he did not think that the decision time with regard to Finland’s NATO membership was at hand. In his view, membership was worth considering, but instead of making hasty decisions, the frequency of evaluating Finland’s security choices should be tightened. Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen of the Center Party however responded that the Russo–Georgian war could also lead to the opposite conclusion, namely that NATO could not defend small states against Russia (YLE, 2008).

In hindsight, the Russo-Georgian was an episode that was quickly forgotten. Vanhanen, as many other European leaders, did not want to punish Russia, but preferred to develop cooperation with Russia instead. Although the image of the US clearly improved after Barack Obama was elected as the US president, the pulling factors were not sufficient to change Finland’s policy. Like Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq before the Libyan operation in 2011 in which Finland did not contribute, seemed to decrease the popularity of NATO. The idea of keeping the option instead of joining seemed to offer the best of two worlds. In August 2013 President Niinistö argued that sitting on the fence was actually a good place to be:

*Dissatisfaction with our current NATO policy – consisting of close cooperation with NATO and the potential of applying for membership at some point – often appears in two different ways. Viewing this as sitting on a fence, one way is to think we should be quick about jumping over the fence, while the other is to think we should not have climbed it in the first place – or at least there was no point to it. I happen to think that being on top of the fence is quite a good place to be. Our present position serves our interests well at this point in time, taken overall. We have freedom to take action, we have choices available, and we have room to observe and to operate. We are not pulled one way or the other.*

This attitude did not change after Russia’s

annexation of Crimea either. Prime Minister Katainen argued in a TV interview that Finland in his opinion should join NATO because it would make Finland more secure (YLE, 2014a). But he deplored that he and the National Coalition Party were in the minority on the NATO issue. Indeed, soon after the interview Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja of the Social Democratic Party contended that NATO membership did not bring any added value (YLE, 2014b). The combination of EU membership and NATO partnership were enough as the crisis in Ukraine had not changed Finland’s geostrategic position at all. Katainen had also stressed that the Ukraine crisis did not constitute any acute security threat and, in line with Tuomioja, regarded it as important not to isolate Russia. However, he was concerned whether Russia would reserve a right to defend its citizens abroad militarily.

The debate on Finland’s NATO membership was not a major issue in the parliamentary elections of 2015 but public debate continued until the 2016 defence review of the government (see Nortio et al, 2022). The review itself did not suggest any major changes to Finland’s policy but contended that “Finland retains the option of joining a military alliance and applying for NATO membership” (Finnish Government, 2016, p. 31). It however added that “the decisions are always considered in real time, taking account of the changes in the international security environment”.

All the key arguments that were later used to justify Finland’s membership bid were basically already there and somewhat more pointedly in the foreign security policy review four years later (Finnish Government, 2020, p. 21): “the increased operations and presence of NATO and the US in the Baltic countries and Poland” were seen as having “enhanced stability in the Baltic Sea region”, while “Russia has weakened the security of our neighbouring areas and Europe by illegally annexing Crimea and by keeping up the conflict it started in Eastern Ukraine”. But even then, the conclusion with regard to Finland’s membership in NATO was the same as before: Finland “retains the option of joining a military alliance and applying for NATO membership” (ibid, p. 30).

In the late 2010s, there were some worries,



pronounced in the debate over Finland's membership in NATO, but also between the lines in the government report, whether the US "commits itself to the principles of and the cooperation central to the rules-based international system" (Finnish Government, 2020, p. 32). But the real reason why the leading politicians and the majority of the political parties did not want to support Finland's membership in NATO was public opinion. The share of those favouring Finland's membership in NATO was slightly growing after the Georgian war in 2008 and the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, but the opponents remained in clear majority. As long as the majority of the public was against NATO membership, politicians tended to stick to the existing policy line of military non-alignment and retaining just "an option" to apply for membership in the future. A self-enforcing loop between public opinion and party positions resisted any major changes in policy: the public did not support the membership because the leading politicians did not do so and vice versa. Besides, changing a policy that has not fundamentally failed is always difficult: the slogan "if it ain't broke, don't fix it" guided Finland's policy towards NATO membership in the post-Cold War era. Given that the public opinion seemed relatively stable, the political leaders did not want to launch an uncertain process.

Particularly in the late 2010s, there was some speculation what Finland should do if Sweden decided to launch an application process. In Sweden, the public opinion seemed have become more supportive of the country's membership in NATO at the same time as the parties of the centre-right coalition in the opposition advocated for the membership and challenged the ruling Social Democrats. For the Finnish foreign policy elite, Sweden was still an identity anchor and therefore Finland should follow Sweden despite the public remaining sceptic, as Finland had done with regard to EU membership in the early 1990s. The expert review commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommended that if Finland were to join NATO, it should do so together with Sweden (Bergqvist et al, 2016). However, worsening relations with Russia and its possible counterreactions were seen as a major problem if Finland decided to apply

for membership in NATO.

Russia's behaviour in the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 and immediately thereafter did not lead to changes in Finland's willingness to join NATO because the amount of provocation to Russia caused by NATO enlargement in times of crisis was thought to grow concurrently with the increased level of deterrence and protection that would be achieved through membership. However, during the 2010s, there was a growing understanding that the NATO option can also be seen as a deterrent. According to this logic, it would not pay off for Russia to put any significant military pressure on Finland or other countries in the Baltic Sea region because it would push them to apply to NATO (Vanhanen, 2016; Hägglund, 2018). It was not clear, however, what Russian actions exactly would indicate that the deterrent had failed and trigger Finland's willingness to join NATO.

## 2020s: The shift in the debate

The public debate on NATO intensified in January 2022 after Russia had presented draft treaties to the United States and NATO about "security guarantees", demanding that NATO should no longer take new members. The Party leader of the National Coalition Party, Petteri Orpo (2021), who had been in favour of Finland's membership in NATO already since the mid-2000s, urged that politicians should now take a position. However, before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, only a few MPs who had not supported Finland's NATO membership openly before did so. For example, Atte Harjanne of the Greens and Anders Adlercreutz of the Swedish People's Party of Finland now publicly announced that Finland should apply for membership in NATO.

Most leading politicians stayed silent before Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine or demanded prudence from others when engaging in the debate. Prime Minister Sanna Marin said in an interview in January 2022 that NATO membership is "very unlikely" during her current term. In her view, Finland did not plan to join NATO in the near future but was ready to stand with its European allies and United States by imposing tough sanctions on Russia. Moreover, Minister for Finance and the leader of the Center Party, Anneli Saarikko, announced that

her party does not support Finland's membership in NATO, albeit it remained committed to the idea of keeping the option of doing so. Former Foreign Minister, Erkki Tuomioja (2022), who later supported the membership bid, published in February a pamphlet on "Finland and NATO - Why Finland should have the opportunity to apply for NATO membership and why that possibility is not worth using now" arguing for continuity in Finland's NATO policy.

Still in January 2022, only 28 per cent of respondents supported the idea of Finland's membership in NATO. In February 2022, however, public opinion started to change. In the social media, the public discussion was very intense. The pro-NATO and anti-NATO camps on Twitter, for example, moved closer together, leaving only the societally marginal, but vocal on Twitter, anti-NATO and anti-vaccine "conspiracy theory" camp as a more isolated bubble (Xia et al, 2022). Two public addresses for a citizen initiative, one on holding a referendum on Finland's NATO membership application and the other for a membership application without a referendum application, were collected in a record time.

In February during the week Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine, the share of citizens in support of joining NATO had risen to a majority: 53 per cent. The support for NATO membership continued to grow during the spring. It was 62 per cent in March while in May, when the decision to apply for membership was officially made, it was already 76 per cent. At the same time, the share of opponents to NATO membership had sunk to less than 15 per cent. More than ten different nationwide public opinion polls using different sampling techniques and slightly different formulations of the question were carried out in the spring and the results were largely very consistent with this trend.

Still in February, President Sauli Niinistö did not think that any fast decisions with regard to Finland's NATO membership were in sight. When Russia had started the full-scale war against Ukraine, Niinistö (President of the Republic of Finland, 2022) dramatically announced that "the mask has come off. Only the cold face of war is visible", emphasizing, however, that there was no current threat against Finland.

In a TV interview a few days later, the President contended that the result of the public opinion poll showing a majority of citizens now in favour of NATO membership was rather expected.

He was however still reserved commenting that "it is easy to get the feeling that in NATO, we are fully protected" (Lakka, 2022). Niinistö's concern had throughout his presidency been and still was possible Russian countermeasures if Finland announced that it was seeking membership in NATO. For years, the President had indicated that he is not able to bring Finland to NATO if the people are against it. Now when the public opinion polls told that the citizens were in favour of applying for the membership, he reclaimed the leadership by launching the process leading to the membership application.

For the President as well as for the Government (Finnish Government, 2022), the stated reason for applying for NATO membership was that it will strengthen Finland's security in the changed operating environment. It may look self-evident that deterrence and military protection were considered to be the most important reasons for joining NATO also by the citizens. They had been the most important reasons before as well, but their importance increased as a result of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Influence and identity were also seen as more important reasons than before, but they were still secondary in the opinion of citizens. Most people regarded that Finland's identity choice was already made when it joined the European Union and therefore membership in NATO was no longer crucial in underlining Finland's Western identity (see Browning, 2002).

By contrast, identity had previously been seen as a factor that decreased the willingness to join the Alliance since NATO enlargement was seen as something that responded to the needs of the former Soviet satellites but not of the neutrals and military non-alignment was associated with positive values and experiences such as peace, bridge-building, and cooperation. The weakening of the ties between Finland and Russia and the risk that citizens would be sent to fight wars far away from their country's borders were traditionally the biggest

reasons for opposing membership in NATO. They were still the primary reasons for those who did not support Finland's membership in NATO, but the relative share of these motivations had decreased dramatically.

## Conclusion

This article has provided a review of the debate over the issue of NATO membership from the end of the Cold War and Finland's decision to join the European Union to 2022 when Finland decided to apply for membership in the Alliance. The debate in itself did not lead to the membership application, and there was no clear evolution in the quality of the debate. There were some changes in the argumentation in the 2000s when Russia was seen as becoming a partner with the West and NATO's role seemed to develop in the context of the war against terrorism, but in 2022 the debate had come a full circle and NATO's role as a defence alliance vis-à-vis the Russian threat was the main issue. Yet, it was not a new generation, as Alpo Rusi (2000, 360) once paraphrased Max Planck's famous view of the scientific paradigm changes, who grew up with the new "truth", but it was the same people who earlier had resisted the membership bid but then supported it. The key arguments remained mostly the same: NATO was primarily about strengthening Finland's security through deterrence and military support in an eventuality of a war.



## References

- Akkanen, J. (1999) 'Presidentti Koivisto torjuu Suomen Nato-jäsenyyden', *Helsingin Sanomat*, 20 September [online]. Available at: <https://www.hs.fi/kotimaa/art-2000003828786.html>
- Astikainen, A. (2006) 'Niinistö on lähes valmis Natoon', *Helsingin Sanomat*, 3 January [online]. Available at: <https://www.hs.fi/kotimaa/art-2000004364464.html>
- Arter, D. (1996) 'Finland: From Neutrality to NATO?', *European Security* 5(4), pp. 614–632.
- Arter, D. (2022) 'From Finlandisation and post-Finlandisation to the end of Finlandisation? Finland's road to a NATO application', *European Security*, early view.
- Bergquist, M., Heisbourg, F., Nyberg, R. and Tiilikainen, T. (2016) 'The Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership: An Assessment'. Helsinki: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Browning, C.S. (2002) 'Coming Home or Moving Home? 'Westernizing Narratives in Finnish Foreign Policy and the Reinterpretation of Past Identities', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 37(1), pp. 47–72.
- Finnish Government (1995) 'Turvallisuus muuttuvassa maailmassa. Suomen turvallisuuspolitiikan suuntalinjat'. Helsinki: State Council.
- Finnish Government (2016) 'Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy'. Helsinki: State Council.
- Finnish Government (2020) 'Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy'. Helsinki: State Council.
- Finnish Government (2022) 'Report on Finland's Accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization', 15 May. Helsinki: State Council.
- Forsberg, T. (2002) *Nato-kirja*. Helsinki: Ajatus.
- Forsberg, T. (2018) 'Finland and NATO: Strategic Choices and Identity Conceptions' in Cottey, A. (ed.), *The European Neutrals and NATO*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 97–127.
- Foyle, D.C. (1997) 'Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Elite Beliefs as a Mediating Variable', *International Studies Quarterly*, 41(1), pp. 141–169.
- Hägglund, G. (2018) *Rauhan utopia*. Jyväskylä: Docendo.
- Hänninen, J. and Rantanen, M. (2008), Poliitikot: Kaukasian kriisi ei vaikuta Suomen linjaan, *Helsingin Sanomat*, 13 August.
- Helsingin Sanomat (2004) "Liittoutumattomuus" on enää orpo ja tarpeeton fraasi, 29 September [online]. Available at: <https://www.hs.fi/paakirjoitukset/art-2000004255425.html>
- Jakobson, M. (1996) 'Max Jakobson arvioi Naton laajenemisen vaikutusta Suomen ja Ruotsin asemaan: "On pohdittava, mikä on turvallisempaa – sitoutuminen vaiko yksinjäminen?"', *Helsingin Sanomat*, 7 May [online]. Available at: <https://www.hs.fi/kotimaa/art-2000003529083.html>
- Lakka, P. (2022) 'A-studio: Sauli Niinistöltä kysyttiin suoraan, pitäisikö Suomen liittyä Natoon – näin hän vastasi', *Iltasanomat*, 1 March [online]. Available at: <https://www.is.fi/politiikka/art-2000008650098.html>
- Lehtilä, H. (2012) *Tarja Halonen. Paremmen maailman puolesta*. Helsinki: Tammi.
- Orpo, P. (2021) 'Natosta kannattaa ja pitää puhua', *Kokoomus.fi*, 30 December [online]. Available at: <https://www.kokoomus.fi/petteri-orpo-natosta-kannattaa-ja-pitaa-puhua/>
- Nortio, E., Jasinskaja-Lahti, I., Hämäläinen, M. and Pakkasvirta, J. (2022) 'Fear of the Russian bear? Negotiating Finnish national identity online', *Nations and Nationalism*, 28(3), pp. 861–876.

Penttilä, R.E.J. and Karvinen, J. (2022) *Pitkä tie Natoon*. Helsinki: Otava.

President of the Republic of Finland (2022) 'Finland strongly condemns Russia's actions and warfare', 24 February [online]. Available at: <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/news/president-niinisto-finland-strongly-condemns-russias-actions-and-warfare/>

Rahkonen, J. (2007) 'Public Opinion, Journalism and the Question of Finland's Membership of NATO', *Nordicom Review*, 28(2), pp. 81–92.

Reuters (2022) 'Finland's PM says NATO membership is "very unlikely" in her current term', January 19 [online]. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/finlands-pm-says-nato-membership-is-very-unlikely-her-watch-2022-01-19/>

Rusi, A. (2000) *Mariankadun puolelta*. Helsinki: Otava.

Sierla, A. (2007) 'Suomen mahdollisen Nato-jäsenyyden vaikutukset'. Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland.

Stubb, A. (2008) 'The first post-080808 diagnose', 25 August [online]. Available at: [https://um.fi/speeches/-/asset\\_publisher/up7ecZeXFRAS/content/ulkoministeri-stubb-linjasi-maailmanpolitiikan-kaannekohdan-haasteita](https://um.fi/speeches/-/asset_publisher/up7ecZeXFRAS/content/ulkoministeri-stubb-linjasi-maailmanpolitiikan-kaannekohdan-haasteita)

Särkkä, I. (2019) *Nato-retoriikka Suomen turvallisuuspoliittisessa keskustelussa*. Helsinki: University of Helsinki.

Tuomioja, E. (2022) *Suomi ja Nato – Miksi Suomella pitää olla mahdollisuus hakea Naton jäseneksi ja miksi sitä mahdollisuutta ei nyt kannata käyttää*. Helsinki: Työväen sivistysliitto.

Vanhanen, M. (2016) *Ulkopolitiikkaa*. Helsinki. Nurmijärvi: Matti Vanhanen.

Vesikansa, J. (2007) 'Presidentti Halonen: "Ei perustetta liittyä Natoon"', 22 November [online]. Available at: <https://suomenkuvalehti.fi/politiikka-ja-talous/presidentti-halonen-ei-perustetta-liittya-natoon/>

Welch, D. (2005) *Painful Choices: A Theory of Foreign Policy Change*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Xia, Y., Gronow, A., Malkamäki, A., Ylä-Anttila, T., Keller, B. and Kivelä, M. (2022) 'How the Russian invasion of Ukraine depolarized the Finnish NATO discussion'. arXiv:2212.07861

YLE (2008) 'Vanhanen ei tue Stubbin näkemyksiä Nato-jäsenyydestä', 25 August. Available at: <https://yle.fi/a/3-5848946>

YLE (2014a) 'Katainen: Suomen kannattaisi kuulua Natoon', 12 April [online]. Available at: <https://yle.fi/a/3-7187922>

YLE (2014b) 'Tuomioja: Natosta seuraisi ongelmia', 12 April [online]. Available at: <https://yle.fi/a/3-7188027>